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Abstract

Who Should Have the Hammer? Leadership of SSTR Planning and Operations.
It is easy to point fingers when it comes to U.S. collective shortfalls in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) planning and execution. Recent attempts at refining direction and organization have gone a long way towards developing constructs to achieve better unity of effort across USG entities, specifically the Departments of State and Defense. However, shortfalls remain in U.S. ability to plan and execute SSTR operations as dictated. This paper argues that DoD should lead planning and execution of SSTR operations as it is the only department with the planning expertise and capacity to set conditions for executing key tasks in order to achieve national strategic objectives. Data on defining the key tasks associated with SSTR and current guidance from executive and departmental branches is provided.
Additionally, a brief examination of key historical operations is discussed, and capacity, capability and expertise to execute the common key tasks is addressed. Finally, conclusions on these topics and U.S. ability to execute as written across the USG departments and agencies are suggested, and recommendations to maximize capacity and synergy to better set conditions to achieve national strategic objectives in SSTR operations are provided.
INTRODUCTION
Recent experience in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations has been less than perfect. Many books have been written, with more sure to follow, on U.S. successes and failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much discussion on the topic is related to "ownership" and the ultimate responsibility of the stabilization and reconstruction effort. Some of the discussion involves in-depth analysis of what went wrong while others look to place blame on the responsible "entity."
It is easy to point fingers when it comes to U.S. collective shortfalls in SSTR planning and execution, but in this case a "look in the mirror" is more appropriate for all involved. The U.S. did not get it right in Afghanistan, and unfortunately many of the same planning and execution errors were repeated in Iraq. The errors span across the collective US Government, but particularly involve DoD, DoS and many of the defense related interagency players.
In These new organizational efforts and documents moved some of the ambiguity associated with roles and responsibilities into more clearly defined lanes; however, it can be argued that many "holes" remain in U. S. ability to effectively plan and execute SSTR operations as dictated in NSPD-44 and associated DoS/DoD instructions. The transition to SSTR operations in any campaign is absolutely crucial to the effective and timely regeneration of long-term regional stability. In addition to the obvious benefit of returning a nation to self-sufficiency, effective transitions also enable quicker withdrawal of forces and allow much needed reconstitution and preparation time for follow-on requirements.
Although SSTR is a single "phase" in the much larger campaign plan, the interdepartmental and interagency coordination required for success in this phase is crucial.
It is important to understand the successes and failures of previous operations and the tasks associated with planning and executing all phases of major operations. As with any objective, a synergistic effort that matches capability and capacity toward the objective should be the goal. As tasks for SSTR operations are dissected, it becomes apparent the current guidance for planning and executing phase IV operations does not account for limited capacity within organizations that have responsibility for operations and tasks within this phase. This paper argues that DoD should lead the planning and execution of SSTR operations as it is the only department with the planning expertise and capacity to set conditions for executing key tasks in order to achieve national strategic objectives. Upon examination, the common key tasks between the State and Defense departments are: Security, Humanitarian Assistance, Governance, Economic Development, and
Reconstruction. The importance of security is noted in all studies and is paramount to enable accomplishment of the remaining key tasks. As such, military presence is important in most stability efforts to set conditions for effective SSTR operations. The remaining key tasks definitely involve essential players from the entire spectrum of USG departments and agencies.
A final consideration when analyzing key tasks for the operation is the fact that transition from phase III (Conflict) to phase IV (Stability) is generally not a clearly defined or "black and white" instance in time. Generally, although the majority of SSTR operations occur during the initial post-hostilities phase, some SSTR tasks occur in varying degrees through all phases of an operation. 11 The operational factor of time should be addressed both in planning and execution specifically as it relates to the extent security is attained within any given area and the ability of the government and civilian agencies to support the overall SSTR tasks.
Although the transition may extend over some time increment, the criticality of the initial efforts to set conditions favorable to stability is paramount to success. According to
Stephenson, these initial efforts are akin to the "golden hour" in trauma care. In medicine, the "golden hour" is the first hour after injury when survivability is exponentially increased with proper treatment. Stephenson follows that in SSTR operations, the "golden hour" falls inside the first year post-hostilities where popular support and successful transformation require steadily improving conditions. 12 In order to remain ahead of the enemy, take first advantage of this "golden hour," and achieve pre-conditions for reconstruction efforts, this suggests the U. S. military should be directly involved in the planning and initial execution of SSTR operations to establish stability as the nation"s "first responders."
CURRENT GUIDANCE to support efforts during and following Phase 4 (Stabilize). Within each GCC, planning efforts are primarily handled in the J-5 (Policy and Plans) directorate but are supported by other directorates to include the J-2 (Intelligence) and J-3 (Operations). As an example looking at FY06 numbers, the CENTCOM GCC alone employs over 2,100 personnel with a significant number supporting the planning function. The PACOM GCC employs upwards of 4000 personnel. 24 Although most are uniformed military, the GCC"s also employ permanent members from other areas to include the State department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, each GCC maintains a ready capability to easily increase capacity with trained augmentees supplied by the uniformed services. Finally, the JFC will normally have an indigenous planning staff to further compliment overall capacity.
Capability, capacity and expertise undoubtedly reside within both the State and Defense Departments. It is arguable, however, these exist at different and widely varying degrees of depth and scope within each department. Sheer numbers of personnel support a much larger planning capacity in Defense, and capability is arguably derived in S/CRS only due to its "interagency" staffing and stand-up of interagency teams within the IMS construct.
Expertise is significant in both departments, although it can be argued that expertise in "planning" resides continuously in the GCC while "nation-building" expertise resides in the State Department.
Opposing viewpoints challenge that key tasks for SSTR operations are outside the military"s core "job description" and more accurately reside in the State Department lane.
Although certain key task expertise definitely resides in State, it can be argued that expertise in each task also lies within Defense with the potential exception of economic development.
Security and initial governance fall within DoD purview, and DoD maintains great capacity and expertise in certain reconstruction tasks through its fielded combat engineer teams. With respect to humanitarian assistance, there can be no argument against the military expertise and capacity as proven over dozens of relief efforts through the last few decades. It can also be argued that State"s capacity is truly realized only through heavy assistance from other departments and agencies.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of this paper found many guiding documents to define key tasks associated with conducting stability operations. It is evident that disagreement exists in departmental efforts to define the key tasks involved in SSTR operations. Differences in methodology only serve to complicate U. S. ability to fully integrate and deliver unity of effort towards achieving operational objectives.
Current guidance directing DoS to lead the planning and execution of SSTR operations is clear. 25 Although the guidance is clear, it is debatable whether it is fully executable as written. With current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq both centered on CENTCOM military commanders and planners, it can be concluded that if not executable as written, the current guidance is at least not the desired approach for some reason.
Analysis strongly suggests successful historical SSTR operations were planned well in advance of execution. Additionally, these successful efforts include early decision on leadership as well as a full-spectrum approach and interagency coordination. Effective SSTR operations are multi-dimensional and require sufficient time to adequately plan and coordinate.
Additionally, the Department of Defense has historically been the only department with the true capacity to lead the planning effort as well as a majority of the key task execution. "Current" history also shows military in leadership of SSTR operations. As such, history supports the Defense Department as the choice for leading SSTR planning and execution. However, current ability must be applied to historical analysis in order to draw accurate conclusions.
With respect to today"s ability, it can be concluded that capability and expertise to lead planning efforts for SSTR operations reside in both the State and Defense Departments.
However, as the common key tasks are analyzed it becomes apparent that the overall capacity and expertise in planning strongly supports the GCC staff(s) for leading the effort.
The transition from planning to execution also favors the capacity in Defense as the military will almost always be the only department with enough personnel to ensure coverage of all key locations and thereby set conditions for remaining tasks.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Both departments contain capability and expertise, albeit in different areas and to varying degrees. However, only the Department of Defense truly has the capacity to lead the complicated planning and execution of SSTR operations, especially in the early transition to post-combat operations where security is being ensured at different intervals. As such, DoD should retain the lead for planning and execution of SSTR operations. Executive direction should be changed to delineate DoD lead until such time as stability can be ensured for an effective transition of leadership to the State Department for reconstruction. Guidance should mandate key State involvement to properly incorporate the expertise that resides in our State professionals.
Identifying common key tasks is critical to ensure unity of effort and to ensure maximum synergy and efficiency in execution of SSTR operations. Although many efforts from various organizations have produced very thoughtful tasklists, efforts should be taken to combine the "best of the best" for a common set of SSTR planning and execution across the USG. Identification for leadership in SSTR operations should take into account the requirement for resident knowledge of the full spectrum of tasks associated with the phase.
Additionally, current guidance which dictates exercises and war-gaming to test leadership options and force interdepartmental and interagency coordination needs continual focus and support across the departments. The first time personnel from different SSTR planning organizations meet should not be when the armistice or cease-fire agreement is signed.
The most defining recommendation gained from history is the need to determine leadership for SSTR operations well in advance of execution. Early determination allows planning efforts to properly coordinate across organizations and ensures a full-spectrum approach to solutions. All successful stability and reconstruction efforts maintain this common theme.
Leadership does not imply dictatorship. Much to the contrary, it implies responsibility. Although conclusions point to the intrinsic DoD capacity, it must be understood that true expertise in rebuilding the instruments of governance and civil society inherently reside in our State Department professionals. As such, a fully coordinated effort of all USG departments and agencies to maximize the capability, capacity and expertise of each is recommended. All organizations with interest or expertise in the operations should be involved at an appropriate level to ensure proper ability to influence.
Much like the factors that drove the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the "jointness" of our collective national security team needs improvement, especially in the areas of planning and execution. Although "joint" is arguably not the correct term, the important implications include the lack of a common language, a common approach to problem-solving, and unity of effort in execution through true leadership of interdepartmental cooperation and coordination. A "joint" State/Defense document outlining "doctrinal" guidelines for key principles and language would go a long way towards synergizing Phase IV operations.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the proper organizational integration of Defense and State personnel into a cohesive team is key. The recently formed AFRICOM geographic combatant command shows promise in its effort to combine the synergistic capabilities, capacity and expertise of its respective personnel. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM also offer different but viable options for integration. These models should be closely monitored and evaluated as potential organizational solutions to many of the issues discussed in this paper relative to SSTR operations.
